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When agencies such as the US Environmenta Protection Agency (EPA) estab ish future greenhouse gas emissions
standards for new vehic es, forecasting future vehic e purchases due to changes in fue economy and prices
provides insight into regu atory impacts. We compare predictions from a nested ogit mode independent y
deve oped for US EPA to a simp e mode where past market share predicts future market share using data from
mode years 2008, 2010, and 2016. The simp e mode outperforms the nested ogit mode for a goodness-ofprediction measures for both prediction years. Inc uding changes in vehic e price and fue economy increases
bias in forecasted market shares. This bias suggests price increases are corre ated with unobserved increases in
vehic e qua ity, changes in preferences, or brand-specifc changes in market size but not cost pass-through. For
2010, past shares predict better than a nested ogit mode despite a major shock, the economic disruption caused
by the Great Recession. Observed share changes during this turbu ent period may ofer upper bounds for po icy
changes in other contexts: the argest observed change in market share across the two horizons is 6.6% for
manufacturers in 2016 and 3.4% for an individua vehic e in 2010.

1. Intr ducti n
Forecasting how vehic e purchases change in response to changes in
fue economy and prices wou d provide insights into regu atory impacts
of vehic e greenhouse gas and fue economy standards put forth by the
United States Environmenta Protection Agency (US EPA) and
Department of Transportation (DOT). For high-qua ity regu atory anaysis, agencies seek re iab e and rep icab e forecasts. A “commitment to
transparency and parsimony” in po icy mode ing improves mode
credibi ity and c arity over what mode s can and cannot do (Sa te i and
Funtowicz, 2014). The US EPA commissioned a mode of consumer
vehic e choice from independent researchers. The mode they deve oped, a nested ogit mode , uses data avai ab e to the agencies and is
intended to ofer “a good compromise between fexibi ity and simp icity” (Greene and Liu, 2012).
We ask, is the independent y deve oped mode of consumer vehic e
choice better at forecasting than an even simp er mode – one of persistent market shares? We compare prediction accuracy using severa
goodness of ft measures for two horizons, two years and eight years,
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and eva uate whether our resu ts are driven by the nested ogit mode 's
sensitivity to parameter va ues. Our work joins a new research agenda
focused on cross-va idation and mode sensitivity, in contrast to exp aining existing variation in the new vehic e feet and simu ating
counter-factua scenarios. In transportation po icy, recent work has
emphasized mode sensitivity (Xie and Lin, 2017; Sakti et a ., 2017) and
the process of mode deve opment (Ciufo and Fontaras, 2017). Machine earning's emphasis on cross-va idation and assessing the qua ity
of mode predictions out of samp e is spi ing over to traditiona
econometric too s (Athey, 2017).
Our nested ogit mode fts within a ong ineage of mode s designed
to a ow consumer substitution across diferent vehic e types. These
mode s typica y describe a static equi ibrium; ear y work amented that
“the treatment of dynamics is not entire y satisfying” (Go dberg, 1995).
As an a ternative, we ofer the simp est dynamic mode possib e: market
shares are persistent and future shares are a function of past shares and
an error term. Our simp e mode is motivated by recent work highighting the empirica signifcance of persistent market shares in o igopo y settings (Sutton, 2007; Bronnenberg et a ., 2009).

We use data avai ab e to the US EPA, annua vehic e sa es data,
manufacturer suggested retai prices, and fue economy, to forecast
mode market share. We use data from 2008, 2010, and 2016. This time
period maximizes the ike ihood of a change in consumer vehic e purchases and comp ements work predicting vehic e sa es in a period of
economic expansion (Haaf et a ., 2014). Economic disruption from the
Great Recession reduced consumer spending (Mian et a ., 2013), increased unemp oyment (Mian and Suf, 2014), and caused particu ar y
severe credit constraints for Genera Motors and Chrys er (Benme ech
et a ., 2017). A so during this time, EPA and the Department of
Transportation (DOT) announced future GHG and fue economy standards for ight-duty vehic es, though they were not efective unti mode
year 2012. Inc uding 2016 a ows us to test a onger horizon that inc udes the economic recovery from the Great Recession. For both 2010
and 2016, we use changes in vehic e price and fue economy from 2008
to predict market shares in a nested ogit mode . Because the mode is
deve oped for regu atory ana ysis, the mode focuses on the variab es
expected to be afected by standards; we do not incorporate changes in
other vehic e characteristics, nor do we observe retai prices.1 We
compare prediction accuracy for the two mode s using goodness-ofprediction measures inc uding the Ku back-Leib er (KL) divergence,
mean squared error and average share error.
We fnd that, despite major economic and regu atory shocks, the
simp e mode forecast of persistent mode market shares outperforms
the nested ogit for a goodness of prediction measures for both
horizons. Our resu t comp ements Haaf et a . (2014), who compare
predicted sa es for 9,000 mu tinomia ogit mode s and fnd that a
simp e forecasting mode ike ours has the east forecast error in the
short run. We difer from Haaf et a . (2014) in severa key ways. First,
we compare predictions for a mode exp icit y and independent y
designed for forecasting by US EPA that uses expert e icitation for nest
e asticities and a more comp ex nesting structure. The mode was
designed specifca y to ook at the efects of changing vehic e price
and fue economy, the two variab es expected to be afected by regu atory changes.2 Second, we ofer a theoretica justifcation for the
use of a simp e mode of persistent market shares by inking them to
dynamic mode s of o igopo ies. Third, we test mode predictions
during the Great Recession, a period of signifcant economic contraction. In contrast, Haaf et a . (2014) make short run predictions in a
period of moderate economic expansion, using data from 2004 to
2006 to predict sa es in 2007.3
Together with Haaf et a . (2014), our resu ts suggest a simp e mode
is robust to macroeconomic conditions. Whi e the success of the simp e
mode might not surprise critics of integrated assessment mode s used
in c imate change (Pindyck, 2013) or forecasts of oi spot prices (A quist
and Ki ian, 2010), it is surprising in the context of the automotive
sector, where economists have been concerned about strategic pricing
and cost pass-through. Persistent market shares suggest that changes in
feet mix through strategic pricing are an un ike y comp iance path to

1
Manufacturers se vehic es to dea ers at an invoice price. The manufacturer's suggested retai price is higher than the average rea ized retai price due
to manufacturer rebates, trade-in va ue, fnancing costs, and dea er incentives
(e.g. reduced markups). A buquerque and Bronnenberg (2012) simu ate
changes in manufacturer and dea er pricing in response to the Great Recession
and expect that they wou d behave simi ar y: dea er prices wou d decrease by
13 percent and manufacturer prices wou d decrease by 11 percent.
2
In its regu atory ana ysis, EPA (2010, p. 47) ca cu ated vehic e costs based
on ho ding other vehic e attributes constant. For instance, changing from a 6cy inder to a 4-cy inder engine improves fue economy but reduces power; the
cost estimates inc uded the costs of adding a turbocharger to keep power at
previous eve s.
3
Haaf et a . (2014) a so predict vehic e sa es in 2010, after the Great Recession, but they do so using data from 2004 to 2006, data from a period of
economic expansion. In contrast, we use data from the Great Recession to
predict sa es in 2010.

achieve GHG standards.4
In our nested ogit mode , forecasting error arises because increases
in manufacturer suggested retai price appear corre ated with unobserved increases in a vehic e's re ative qua ity – a resu t consistent
with automakers fai ing to pass through techno ogy costs, a pattern
observed in Europe in a retrospective study (Reynert, 2014). Across the
two horizons, the argest observed changes in market share were an
increase of 3.4% at the vehic e eve and a decrease of 6.6% at the
manufacturer eve . Given the magnitude of the macroeconomic shocks,
these changes serve as upper bounds for structura mode po icy simu ations in other contexts. Our resu ts suggest that mode va idation
may be critica when predicting consumer vehic e purchases. Further,
regard ess of macroeconomic conditions, it appears that a simp e mode
of fxed market shares may be suitab e for predicting the future feet in
the short to medium run.
2. Predicting vehicle market share
Rosen (1974) imagined product diferentiation as a two-stage
game, where frms choose product characteristics and product mix in
the frst stage and price in the second stage. Recent y, scho ars have
mode ed automaker decision-making in the medium-run, a owing
automakers to choose price and vehic e characteristics simu taneous y, b urring the frst and second stages (Knitte , 2011; K ier and
Linn, 2012; Whitefoot and Sker os, 2012; Whitefoot et a ., 2017). We
focus on the short to medium run, which we defne as a period when
the feet of mode s is re ative y fxed. In this horizon, automakers can
make minor design changes to existing mode s but do not have enough
time to introduce new mode s or do signifcant redesigns in response
to the shock. We use the simp est mode possib e for endogenous
product design and compare it with a c assic static price-setting mode
designed to examine sa es impacts of changes in fue economy and
vehic e price.
2.1. A imple dynamic model of vehicle market hare
Our simp e mode assumes the market is in equi ibrium and that
automakers p ay a dynamic game. If the market environment is stationary without entry or exit or shocks, optima market share wi be the
same in every period. Given shocks, static mode s overestimate price
e asticity and underestimate frm markups compared to dynamic
mode s (Chen et a ., 2008). We justify our simp e mode of persistent
market shares by pointing to empirica evidence on the persistence of
frm and brand market share in the short run (Sutton, 2007) and across
space (Bronnenberg et a ., 2009).
Market share persistence may be exp ained, in part, by brand oya ty, particu ar y when a brand ofers a sing e mode within a c ass of
vehic es (e.g. Ford Focus, Ford's on y Compact car in 2008 and 2010).
Brand oya ty creates barriers to entry and gives frst movers a durab e
advantage (Bronnenberg et a ., 2012). For autos, Anderson et a . (2015)
show evidence that brand oya ty is transmitted from parents to chi dren. Mannering et a . (1991) document brand oya ty in new cars and
Mannering et a . (2002) fnd the same pattern in auto eases. Brand
oya ty creates a tension between the current period and a stream of
future discounted profts: frms may be wi ing to trade ower markups
today for a stream of higher markups in the future, making them ess
ike y to pass through techno ogy costs or pursue a sa es-mixing comp iance strategy.
Market share persistence may a so be exp ained by endogenous
product design if automakers comp y with fue economy standards by
changing minor vehic e characteristics in a segment. Because peop e
were satisfed with their previous vehic es, keeping the vehic e
4
Greene et a . (2005) fnd that fue economy increases are most y due to
adoption of fue -saving techno ogies rather than shifts in sa es.

apparent y constant might keep them in the same market.5 If changes in
unobserved desirab e product attributes targeted to buyers in that
market are accompanied by an increase in price, this cou d exp ain
persistent market shares as we as weaker prediction qua ity in a demand mode . This strategy wou d substantia y reduce comp iance costs
from fue economy regu ation. Evidence suggests that automakers are
changing attributes, though it is ess c ear whether they are unobserved.
Knitte (2011) argues that, given annua techno ogica advancement,
increasing fue economy may be more a matter of not continuing to
increase weight and acce eration. Whitefoot and Sker os (2012) mode
automakers choosing footprint, acce eration, and other fue -economy
re ated techno ogy as they set prices; they estimate that automakers wi
comp y with US EPA fue economy standards in part by increasing
vehic e footprint. K ier and Linn (2012) mode frms choosing power
and weight (but not engine design), as we as prices, in their “mediumrun” horizon. As compared to a price-on y response, they fnd that
endogenous product design decreases the cost of comp iance. Reynaert
(2014) estimates a mixed ogit mode for automakers facing Europe's
greenhouse gas emissions standards and conc udes that the dominant
response was to use techno ogy to decrease emissions, as opposed to
strategic price-setting to infuence sa es-mix; Greene et a . (2005) found
a simi ar resu t using a ca ibrated nested ogit mode . Train and Winston
(2007) consider the ong run and conc ude that changes in vehic e
characteristics such as size, power, operating cost, transmission type,
re iabi ity, and body type, exp ain decreases in domestic market share
in the US auto market.
Fina y, persistent market shares may be driven by behaviora responses by either consumers or dea ers. Dea ers order their stock of
vehic es at the beginning of the mode year and may base their order on
vehic es so d the previous year, intensifying any under ying persistence
in vehic e market shares. Dea ers may then use pricing and fnancing
incentives to se their inventory, which is simi ar the previous year,
even when consumer preferences change. For their part, consumers
may be most interested in vehic e characteristics that are persistent
across mode years, meaning that decreases in price or increases in fue
economy may be ess sa ient than fxed characteristics.
2.2. A tatic price- etting model of di crete con umer choice
The forecasting mode deve oped for US EPA mode s vehic es as
diferentiated products so d by mu tiproduct o igopo ists in a one-shot
Bertrand competition. Simi ar to other vehic e choice papers, the mode
assumes vehic e characteristics (other than fue economy and price) are
fxed in the short run and focuses on the second stage, price-setting.
Heterogeneity in consumer preferences is represented in a nested ogit
(NL), simi ar to Go dberg (1995). The main a ternatives to NL are mixed
ogit (e.g. Berry et a ., 1995) and a inear system of equations (e.g.
Austin and Dinan, 2005).6 Each approach estimates a demand system,
which connects prices from po icy change scenarios to predicted
changes in vehic e sa es. For NL, the mode er embodies heterogeneity in
consumer preferences through the nesting structure instead of estimated random coefcients, as in the mixed ogit case. Go dberg used a
5
Work in this area tends to use a mixed ogit framework to capture consumer
heterogeneity. Their main cha enge is to credib y represent unknown consumer
and manufacturer tradeofs between fue economy techno ogy and other vehic e
characteristics (acce eration, weight, footprint, etc.).
6
An a ternative to discrete choice mode s is to use a system of inear equations, own- and cross-price supp y and demand e asticities by vehic e, to predict
sa es in response to an increase in price. For examp e, Austin and Dinan (2005)
use proprietary demand e asticities from Genera Motors (used in K eit, 2004)
and inferred supp y e asticities from an equi ibrium assumption, observed
dea er markups, and an assumption on how these re ate to manufacturer
markups. They use this system of equations to estimate how vehic e sa es mix
changes in response to expected changes in vehic e net price as a resu t of fue
economy standards.

NL when estimating the impact of fue economy standards on vehic e
choice (1995, 1998). More recent y, Greene et a . (2005) and Harrison
et a . (2008) used NL to eva uate the 2011–2015 CAFE standards. NL
has a so been used to better understand demand for a ternative fue
vehic es (Brownstone et a ., 1996) and used by other regu atory agencies (Bunch et a ., 2011).
US EPA contracted with researchers to deve op a mode of consumer
vehic e choice; the NL framework was justifed by Greene and Liu
(2012) as “readi y ca ibrated with on y a sma amount of information
… [and it] a ows for substantia fexibi ity in representing substitutions
among vehic e types.”7 Vehic e sa es are predicted to change in response to changes in net vehic e price, which is ca cu ated as the increase in vehic e cost associated with techno ogies to reduce GHGs, ess
a discounted share of future fue savings associated with those techno ogies.8 Demand e asticities for each vehic e nest are not estimated
from an origina data set, but rather are based on reviewing estimates in
the iterature (Greene and Liu, 2012, Tab e 4). This approach a ows for
synthesis of the resu ts from mu tip e ana yses, and professiona judgment about whether the va ues are appropriate. The parsimonious
mode design avoids adding additiona uncertainty from projecting
changes in other vehic e characteristics and consumers' margina wi ingness to pay for changes in vehic e characteristics. Estimates of consumers' margina wi ingness to pay for vehic e attributes vary great y
and may be sensitive to mode formu ation and estimation (Greene
et a ., 2018).
The mode is designed for static, same-year ana ysis of the efects on
vehic e sa es of adding fue -saving techno ogies and their costs; that is,
it is intended to compare vehic e sa es with and without fue -saving
techno ogies and additiona costs for a sing e feet of vehic es. In
princip e, then, changes in the economy, demographics, or the feet
over time shou d not afect the abi ity of the mode to predict, because it
is predicting against a same-period static counter-factua . Over time,
changing conditions might ead to changes in consumer responsiveness.
Though a forecasting mode that inc udes macroeconomic and demographic information, as we as other changes in vehic e characteristics, might appear to be more suitab e for projecting the impacts of
standards in the future, such a mode 's efectiveness depends on the
qua ity of the forecasts for those additiona factors, and how they interact with other mode parameters.
3. Data and instituti nal c ntext
The nested ogit mode was designed to use data assemb ed by EPA
and DOT for their ana ysis of GHG and fue economy standards for MYs
2017-25 (U.S. EPA and DOT, 2012). We test goodness-of-prediction
using annua vehic e sa es and price data for mode years (MY) 2008,
2010 (EPA and DOT, 2012), and 2016 (U.S. EPA, 2018). Price is the
manufacturer's suggested retai price (MSRP).9 Each mode year
7
Mixed ogit ofers a more fexib e representation of consumer heterogeneity.
Since Berry et a . (1995), it has been used in vehic e choice mode ing (e.g.
Petrin, 2002; Jacobsen, 2013) but mode predictions may be sensitive to start
va ues and the optimization routine (Knitte and Metaxa og ou, 2014). When
prices are corre ated with unobserved vehic e characteristics, demand mode s
require instruments to consistent y estimate preference and cost parameters.
8
Greene (2010) found high y varied estimates in the iterature of consumer
wi ingness to pay (WTP) for additiona fue economy in the vehic e purchase
decision, with a number of studies showing WTP ess than the expected va ue of
future fue savings, and some others showing overva uation. The mode a ows a
user to choose the number of years of expected fue savings that vehic e buyers
are be ieved to consider in their purchase decisions, as we as the future fue
prices and discount rate they might use for those ca cu ations.
9
MSRP difers from the transacted price – it fai s to refect cash incentives to
customers or dea ers, which are arger for ess fue efcient vehic es and vary
with gas prices (Langer and Mi er, 2013). Proprietary datasets with transaction
prices for a samp e of transactions exist (e.g. Autodata So utions, the dataset

Table 1
Summary statistics for observed changes in feet.
2008

Number unique vehic es
Tota sa es
Percentage sa es matched
Weighted average price
Minimum price
Maximum price
Weighted avg fue economy
Minimum fue economy
Maximum fue economy

2010

2016

Observed

Aggregated (2010)

Aggregated (2016)

Observed

Aggregated

Observed

Aggregated

1,302
13,851,770
–
27,873
11,783
1,734,000
26.2
12.0
65.8

524
12,976,769
93.7%
27,702
11,783
1,734,000
27.4
12.0
65.8

179
12,741,662
92.0%
27,868
13,455
385,279
25.61
13.1
65.8

1,171
11,190,181
–
26,767
9,970
1,700,000
28.4
12.0
70.8

524
10,199,188
91.1%
26,624
11,923
1,700,000
28.3
12.0
70.8

1,229
16,262,536
–
29,407
11,504
495,323
31.5
15.0
218.1

179
15,094,485
92.8%
29,404
14,872
467,813
28.3
15.7
70.1

Table 2
Vehic e c ass defnition and e asticities in the consumer vehic e choice mode .

Table 3
Defau t e asticities, nests 1-3.

Mode C ass

E asticity

Parent Nest

EPA F eet

Leve

Prestige Two-Seaters
Prestige Subcompact Cars
Prestige Compact Cars and Sma Station
Prestige Midsize Cars and Station
Wagons
Prestige Large Cars
Two-Seater
Subcompact Cars
Compact Cars and Sma Station Wagons
Midsize Cars and Station Wagons
Large Cars
Prestige SUVs
Sma SUVs
Midsize SUVs
Large SUVs
Minivans
Cargo/Large Passenger Vans
Sma Pickup Trucks
Standard Pickup Trucks
U tra Prestige Vehic es

−3.8
−3.5*
−3.5
−3.6*

Two-Seater
Prestige Car
Prestige Car
Prestige Car

Car
Car
Car
Car

−3.5
−3.5
−5
−5
−5
−5
−3.7
−4.9
−5.1
−5.1
−4.9
−5.1
−5.1
−5.1
−3.9

Prestige Car
Two-Seater
Standard Car
Standard Car
Standard Car
Standard Car
Prestige SUV
Standard SUV
Standard SUV
Standard SUV
Minivan
Cargo Van
Cargo Pickup
Cargo Pickup
U tra Prestige

Car
Car
Car
Car
Car
Car
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck
Truck

Choice Among 19 Vehic e C asses within Vehic e Type
3
Two-Seater
−1.3
3
Prestige Car
−2.2
3
Standard Car
−3
3
Prestige SUV
3
Standard SUV
−2.7
3
Minivan
3
Cargo Van
3
Cargo Pickup
−2
3
U tra Prestige
Choice of Vehic e Type within Passenger or Cargo Categories
2
Passenger
−1.1
2
Cargo
−0.7
2
U tra Prestige
Choice of Passenger, Cargo or U tra Prestige Vehic e
1
Buy
−0.7
1
No Buy

Notes: *Parameter va ues difer for 2016 predictions due to nest e asticity requirement. Prestige Subcompact Cars e asticity was −4.1 and Prestige Midsize
Cars was −3.6. These were the c osest va ues to the origina set that were
feasib e.
(1) Prestige and non-prestige c asses are defned by vehic e price: the prestige
are vehic es whose prices are higher than or equa to unweighted average price
in the corresponding EPA c ass, and vice versa for non-prestige vehic es, e.g.,
Prestige Two-Seater c ass is the set of re ative y expensive vehic e confgurations in EPA c ass of two seaters with prices higher than or equa to the unweighted average price of EPA two seaters.
(2) Non-prestige SUVs are divided into sma , midsize and arge SUVs by vehic e's footprint (sma : footprint < 43; midsize: 43 ≤ footprint < 46; arge:
footprint ≥ 46).
(3) U tra Prestige c ass is defned as the set of vehic es whose prices are higher
than or equa to $75,000.

contains over a thousand unique vehic es at the trim eve . For examp e,
there are 20 diferent versions of the Chevro et Si verado in the 2008
data, each unique based on engine, footprint, fue economy, and other
attributes. We aggregate trims using the sa es-weighted average vehic e
price and fue economy for each vehic e.10 Tota sa es fa by about 20%
(footnote continued)
used in Langer and Mi er, 2013 or the proprietary data used in Busse et a .,
2013). Other researchers use MSRP (e.g., Austin and Dinan, 2005; Bento et a .,
2009), in part for its accessibi ity. In part for accessibi ity and in part because it
is prospective (rea ized retai prices are on y found in retrospect), the EPA
mode uses MSRP. 2016 prices are defated to 2008 do ars.
10
This is simi ar in magnitude to Reynaert (2014), who has about 400 mode engine variants per market and captures 80% of the tota samp e, dropping
vehic es with sma market shares.

Name

E asticity

Parent Category
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Passenger
Cargo
Cargo
U tra Prestige
Buy
Buy
Buy
Root
Root

during the recession. We focus on vehic e market share, not the eve of
vehic es so d.
To predict market share in 2010, each MY 2008 vehic e needed to
be matched with its MY 2010 counterpart. This matching is not
straightforward.11 Vehic es enter and exit the market between any two
mode years; for examp e, Saab dropped out of the market entire y
during this time and Genera Motors dropped 21 mode s between 2008
and 2010. After aggregation, we match 524 vehic es that capture 94%
of the MY 2008 vehic es so d, and 91% of MY 2010 vehic es so d.
Dropped mode market share is about 13% of tota sa es in each year.
To predict sa es in 2016, we aggregated data to the manufacturerc ass eve . Match qua ity was simi ar to that in 2010. Tab e 1 compares
the disaggregated feet to the aggregated feet. Prices and fue economy
do not difer great y. In tota , 108 vehic es remained unmatched because they were manufactured in one year but not in the other; these
are dropped in the 2010 ana yses.12 Changes in avai ab e mode s between two years are fair y common in the auto industry, and are among
the cha enges associated with predicting changes in vehic e purchases.
Annua vehic e- eve variation in the percentage change in price and

11
In some cases, vehic es change c assifcation across the years, e.g. from
Subcompact to Subcompact Prestige. In these cases, we use the 2008 EPA
c assifcations/nests for predictions and observed 2010 vehic e sa es outcomes.
12
As a robustness check, we aggregate trims to each to manufacturer-c ass for
2010 as we . In this specifcation, for examp e, we predict future market shares
for Nissan compact cars to be the same as current market shares for the suite of
compact cars ofered by Nissan. This approach a ows us to inc ude mode s that
were unmatched across years. However, we are sti ob igated to drop manufacturers not observed in both periods (e.g. Saab). Our resu t – that the simp e
mode predicts better than the nested ogit – is robust to this aggregation
strategy. Resu ts avai ab e upon request.

fue economy for 2010 and 2016 is shown in Fig. 1. The distribution for
price is near y symmetric about zero, whereas the distribution for fue
economy is skewed toward increases in fue economy. Together, these
fgures fai to suggest that changes in price are determined by increased
costs from fue economy techno ogy. On average, fue economy increased by 3% in 2010, in keeping with the trend for fue economy in
the mid-2000s in the U.S. market (US EPA, 2016).13
Our mode eva uation compares sa es in 2010 to sa es in 2008, a
window of time punctuated by macroeconomic shocks and trends.
Housing prices fe , decreasing househo d wea th; in response, consumer spending dropped (Mian et a ., 2013). Reduced consumer demand caused an increase in unemp oyment (Mian and Suf, 2014).
Meanwhi e, auto credit markets contracted, with the most severe decreases in ow income markets (Amronin and McGranahan, 2015) and
for easing companies re ated to Genera Motors and Chrys er
(Benme ech et a ., 2017). Gas prices were very high in ear y to mid2008, exceeding $4 per ga on. Consumers responded by purchasing
more fue efcient vehic es in 2008 (Busse et a ., 2013). Lower gas
prices in 2010 reduced returns to fue economy. In 2009 the US government ent Chrys er and GM more than 20 bi ion do ars to enab e
them to make payments to workers and creditors. The bai out may have
reduced enthusiasm for GM and Chrys er vehic es from American
consumers in 2010. Few economists were optimistic that either company wou d withstand the Great Recession (Goo sbee and Krueger,
2015). Changes between 2010 and 2016 were ess dramatic, characterized instead by a steady economic recovery.
Two vehic e po icy changes occurred between 2008 and 2010: the
federa Cash for C unkers program and the announcement of new ight
duty vehic e standards by EPA and DOT. The Cash for C unkers program
increased vehic e purchases in 2009 in part by pu ing forward about
300,000 vehic es that wou d have been purchased in 2010 (Mian and
Suf, 2012; Li et a ., 2013).14 In 2009, the US EPA and DOT announced
ight-duty vehic e GHG and fue economy standards for mode years
2012–16, fna ized in ear y 2010.15 Though the standards wou d not go
into efect unti mode year 2012, it is possib e that automakers started
to change vehic e characteristics in preparation for comp iance with the
standard, acce erating the dep oyment of techno ogy re ated to fue
economy.16
4. Meth ds
Like some others mode ing consumer vehic e choice (e.g. Sen et a .,
2017; Haaf et a ., 2014; Xie and Lin, 2017), we focus on market shares,
rather than vehic e sa es. In our case, market shares mitigate changes in
tota sa es from the Great Recession. We examine whether the simp e
mode or the static mode performed better in predicting changes in the
composition of the feet, as measured by market share, in the face of the
Great Recession's signifcant market shock.
13
Note that the re ationship between improvement in fue economy and reduced fue consumption is non- inear. See Larrick and So (2008).
14
To be e igib e for the Cash for C unkers program, a new car needed to have
a price be ow $45,000 and get at east 22 MPG. For SUVs, medium-duty passenger vehic es, pickup trucks, minivans and cargo vans, the MPG requirement
was 18 MPG. For vans with a whee base that exceeded 124 inches or arge
pickup trucks with a whee base that exceeded 115 inches, the requirement was
at east 15 MPG. Very arge vans and trucks (Category 3) had no MPG minimum
but were required to be made no ater than MY2001.
15
These standards were in part a response to the Energy Independence and
Security Act of 2007, which required a feet average fue economy of at east 35
mi es per ga on (mpg) by 2020. The new standards use a footprint-based
system, which re ates a manufacturer's emissions and fue economy ob igations
to the vehic e footprint, defned as the area between the whee base and track
and measured in square feet.
16
Reynaert (2014) found that automakers updated vehic e techno ogy in
anticipation of EU GHG standards, reaching comp iance before the dead ine.

Consider a discrete choice representative consumer framework
where uti ity is derived from unobserved vehic e characteristics Ajk and
vehic e cost Gj . To simp ify notation, we describe the mode for two
eve s of nests. For vehic e j in c ass k, vehic e cost is a combination of
price Cjk and a share of the present discounted va ue of savings Fjk from
fue economy.17

Ujk = Ajk + Bk Gj +

jk

= Ajk + Bk (Cjk

Fjk ) +

jk

(1)

If the error term is distributed extreme va ue, the choice probabi ity
for a ternative j is Pjk = Pj | k Pk , which is equa to its market share.18 The
conditiona probabi ity of choosing a ternative j given that an a ternative in c ass k is se ected is Pj | k , defned as

exp(Ajk + Bk Gj )

Pj | k =
j

k

exp(Ajk + Bk Gj )

(2)

The margina probabi ity of choosing an a ternative in c ass k is

exp Ak +

Broot
ln
Bk

j k

exp(Ajk + Bk Gj )

Pk =
k

exp Ak +

Broot
ln
Bk

j k

exp(Ajk + Bk Gj )

(3)

where Broot is the genera ized cost coefcient for vehic e c asses.
4.1. Simple model foreca t: per i tent market hare
A simp e econometric mode of vehic e market shares inspired by
Sutton (2007) predicts that o igopo ists' vehic e market shares are
persistent across time. Forma y, this corresponds to the coefcient Bk
equa to zero in equation (1). Vehic e shares are sti a function of the
inferred vehic e constant term Ajk , though the constant is not ca cuated. In the simp e mode , forecasted shares are equa to past shares:

E [Pj, t + 1] = Pj, t

(4)

As in the nested ogit mode , our unit of ana ysis is annua market
share for a mode made by a manufacturer for 2010 and manufacturernest for 2016. Data are at the annua eve to refect the types of data
avai ab e to US EPA. Assuming persistence at a fne eve ike the vehic e is in keeping with recent evidence that consumers shift between
vehic es with the same footprint in response to gas shocks (Leard et a .,
2017).19
4.2. Ne ted logit model
Greene and Liu (2012) deve oped a vehic e choice mode for EPA
intended to estimate changes in tota sa es and feet mix in response to
GHG and fue economy standards. Given a vehic e feet, the mode a ows regu ators to compare vehic e sa es and fue economy with and
without fue economy standards.20 The nested ogit mode (NL) forecasts vehic e market share using observed shares, fue economy, and
17

Great debate exists about the ro e of fue savings in consumer vehic e
purchases (Greene, 2010; Greene et a ., 2018). Some researchers fnd that vehic e buyers consider the expected fu ifetime of fue savings in deciding on
how much fue economy to buy (e.g., Busse et a ., 2013), whi e others argue
that buyers put much ess emphasis on fue economy (Ga agher and
Mueh egger, 2011).
18
Forma y, the probabi ity is P (j k ) = P (j|k ) P (k ) .
19
As noted above, as a robustness check, we aggregated the data to the
manufacturer-c ass eve . Resu ts avai ab e upon request.
20
EPA regu ates GHG emissions from vehic es; the Department of
Transportation regu ates vehic e fue economy. Because the primary way to
reduce GHG emissions is to improve fue economy, the agencies have arge y
harmonized their regu ations (U.S. EPA and DOT, 2010, 2012). The mode uses
fue economy rather than GHG emissions, because fue economy is more sa ient
an attribute to vehic e buyers and direct y afects expenditures.

price in 2008 and changes in fue economy and price in 2010. The NL
does not estimate price e asticities in ca cu ating the cost coefcients
Bk . Instead, the cost coefcients are approximated using e asticities
from the iterature:

Bk =

k

p¯k (1

S¯k )

(5)

where, for vehic es in c ass k, k is the own-price e asticity, p̄k is average
price, and S̄k is average conditiona market share for vehic es in c ass k.
This expression is derived from the defnition of e asticities and ogit
mode equations (Train, 2009). Tab es 2 and 3 provides the e asticities
used in the ana ysis, which, as discussed above, are the synthesis of
estimates from mu tip e sources (Greene and Liu, 2012). The nested
ogit restricts demand e asticities for the nests: responsiveness to price
must be highest at the individua -vehic e eve , and decrease at each
higher nest.
Given nest cost coefcients, each vehic e's constant term is ca ibrated to ft base ine sa es data. For any two vehic es within a c ass, the
ratio of their probabi ities is equa to the ratio of their shares.

Pi | k
S
e Aik
= i = A ,
Pj | k
Sj
e jk
Aik

Ajk = ln Si

i, j
ln Sj,

k

(6)

i, j

(7)

k

One vehic e's constant is norma ized to zero, giving
Aik = ln Sik ln S1k,
i k , where ln S1k is the share of the norma ized constant. Observed shares and cost coefcients from prices and
fue economy in 2008 pin down vehic e and c ass- eve constants. The
constant for not buying a vehic e is assumed to be zero.
As mentioned above, Greene (2010) found high y varied estimates
in the iterature of consumer wi ingness to pay (WTP) for additiona
fue economy in the vehic e purchase decision. Fue Savings for vehic e j
in mode year t re ative to its base ine confguration are
t+L

Fj (t ) =
=t+1

1
(1 + r )

+1

FP ( ) M (

1)

1
MPGi0 (t )

1
MPGi1 (t )

(8)

where r is the consumer discount rate, L is the payback period in years
(that is, the number of years of future fue savings a buyer considers in
the purchase decision re ative to up-front costs), FP ( ) is the price of
is the OnRoad discount factor that discounts fue
fue in year,
economy in order to refect rea -wor d driving conditions,21 and
1.
M(
1) are the annua mi es trave ed for a vehic e of age
The defau t payback period is assumed to be fve years, consistent
with “the ength of a typica new ight-duty vehic e oan” (U.S. EPA and
DOT, 2010, p. 25517). Future fue savings use a defau t discount rate of
3%.22 Future fue prices are reported in 2008 do ars. Year 1 fue prices
are that year's rea ized fue prices and come from US Energy Information Administration's (EIA) Annua Energy Out ook (2012). Projected
fue prices come from EIA's Annua Energy Out ook Petro eum Product
Prices (2008, 2010).23 In Fig. A-I in the appendix, we see that in 2008
ana ysts expected both gaso ine and fue prices to decrease over a
twenty-year period. In 2010, however, ana ysts expected gaso ine prices
to increase over the next twenty years. Annua mi es trave ed difer for
cars and trucks and decrease over time; see the second pane of Fig. A-I.
These va ues are used by EPA in estimating the efects of MY 2012-16
21

“ʻOnRoad Discount’ is used in fue cost ca cu ation to discounts EPA fue
economy (MPG) test va ue, which is disp ayed in fue economy window stickers
and used in the [mode ], to better refect fue economy under rea -wor d driving
conditions” (Greene and Liu, 2012, p. 39).
22
In the technica appendix, we investigate the sensitivity of mode predictions to variation in the e asticities, payback period, and discount rate.
23
Motor gaso ine prices are ca cu ated based on “ … sa es weighted-average
price for a grades. Inc udes Federa , State, and oca taxes” and “Diese fue for
on-road use. Inc udes Federa and State taxes whi e exc uding county and oca
taxes.”

vehic e fue economy/GHG standards on vehic es (US EPA and DOT,
2010).24
4.2.1. Ne ting framework
The fve-nest structure, shown in Fig. 2, was independent y deve oped by Greene and Liu for US EPA (2012). The structure is simi ar to
Bunch et a . (2011) and NERA (2009). The frst ayer constitutes the
buy/don't buy decision. Next it distinguishes between passenger vehic es, cargo vehic es, and u tra-prestige vehic es.25 The mode then
separates passenger vehic es into Two Seaters, Prestige Cars, Standard
Cars, Prestige SUVs, Standard SUVs, and Minivans, and cargo vehic es
into Pickup Trucks and Vans. The next eve – the ast nest - continues
the division into c asses. At this nest, the mode uses a simp e ogit
mode . Within this nest are the individua vehic es for 2010 and the
weighted averages for manufacturers in 2016. Within nests, ogit exhibits “independence of irre evant attributes:” the ratio of probabi ities
(or market shares, in this mode ) of two options does not vary if a third
option is added to the mix. As a resu t, an increase in the market share
of one a ternative within a nest draws proportionate y from a other
a ternatives (Train, 2009). Across nests, independence of irre evant
attributes does not ho d.
Vehic es are c assifed into nests by type, size, and re ative price.
Vehic es with prices higher than or equa to unweighted average price
in the corresponding EPA c ass are c assifed as Prestige vehic es.26U tra-Prestige vehic es have prices that exceed $75,000. Non-prestige SUVs are divided into sma , midsize and arge SUVs by vehic e
footprint.27
4.2.2. Ne ted logit foreca t
The NL uses data from 2008 to estimate the cost coefcient Bk ,
determined from its own-price e asticity k from the iterature and
average price p̄k and average conditiona market share S̄k within c ass k
according to expression (5). Given cost coefcients Bk , the mode ca ibrates vehic e- eve constants Ajk to ft shares in 2008. To forecast
shares, the mode uses these cost coefcients and vehic e- eve constants as we as the 2010 vehic e cost Gj in expressions (2) and (3) to
ca cu ate the choice probabi ity for a ternative j, Pjk = Pj | k Pk . 2010 vehic e cost Gj is determined by the vehic e's 2010 price and fue
economy.
4.3. Mea uring goodne -of-prediction
We use severa measures to compare goodness-of-prediction across
the simp e and nested mu tinomia ogit mode s. The frst is Ku backLeib er (KL) divergence, which measures the gap between an observed
distribution and a predicted distribution (Ku back and Leib er, 1951).
Maximum ike ihood estimation attempts to minimize the KL divergence, defned as
24

Since the payback period is fve years, on y initia diferences in rea ized
and projected gas prices and mi es trave ed change the vehic e's net price.
25
In the mode , sport-uti ity vehic es and minivans are inc uded as passenger
vehic es, a though many of these vehic es are considered ight-duty trucks for
regu atory purposes. Consumers common y consider these to be passenger vehic es; it is more ike y, for instance, that peop e consider an SUV to be a
substitute for a arge or midsize car than for a pickup truck. Because the mode
is meant to refect consumer decision processes, it was considered appropriate
to nest SUVs and minivans as passenger vehic es rather than cargo vehic es.
26
For examp e, the Prestige Two-Seater c ass is the set of re ative y expensive
vehic e confgurations in EPA's c ass of Two-Seaters, those with prices higher
than or equa to the unweighted average price of EPA Two-Seaters.
27
Sma SUVs have a footprint ess than 43 square feet, Midsize SUVs have a
footprint between 43 square feet and 46 square feet, and Large SUVs have a
footprint greater than or equa to 46 square feet.

KL (P|Q)

Pi ln
i

Pi
Qi

(9)

where Pi is the observed market share and Qi is the predicted market
share. Next, we use two re ated goodness-of-prediction measures, mean
squared error and average share error:

mean squared error

1
N

average share error

1
N

i

i

{Pi
|Pi

Qi} 2
Qi |

(10)
(11)

Like Haaf et a . (2014), we p ot a cumu ative distribution function
(CDF) of abso ute error, |Pi Qi |, to compare mode performance at
diferent error thresho ds. The CDF of error shows the percentage of
mode predictions that have error ess than a given thresho d. To
measure the NL's accuracy in predicting growth or dec ine in market
share, we create a binary variab e equa to one if the direction of the NL
prediction matches the observed change in vehic e market share and
assess the fraction of predictions correct y reported.
5. Results
Tab e 4 reports our goodness-of-prediction measures across the two
mode s. For a measures except Direction, a ow va ue indicates ess
mode error; for both years, for a error measures, the simp e mode
outperforms the Nested Logit (NL). Ku back-Leib er Divergence measures the diference between a predicted distribution and the true distribution. It must be positive and wou d be zero if the mode perfect y
predicted the observed distribution. Tab e 4 shows that the simp e
mode has a ower Ku back-Leib er divergence as compared to the NL.
Mean squared error shows a simi ar pattern: the mean squared error for
the simp e mode is near y ha f that of the NL mode . Mean squared
error uses a quadratic oss function, which pena izes out iers. Average
share error for the simp e mode is about two-thirds that of the NL. The
NL correct y predicted the direction of market share change about twothirds of the time. It appears that the simp e mode 's error distribution is
ess biased and its average error is ower than the NL.28
Next, we turn to the graph of the cumu ative distribution of errors
for both mode s for 2010 in Fig. 3. The cumu ative error function reports the share of predictions that fa within a certain error to erance.
For examp e, 85–90% of the mode s' predictions are within an error
to erance of 0.002. A higher va ue for a given error to erance imp ies
that the mode has a greater share of tota predictions with an error ess
than the to erance. The simp e mode has a higher share of predictions
within the to erance for a error to erances. For very ow to erances,
such as those be ow 0.0005, the diference between the two mode s is
sma .
The better forecasting performance of our simp e mode is in ine
with other papers that test out-of-samp e predictions of vehic e choice,
particu ar y those that compare estimates to a simp e mode of static
market shares. Haaf et a . (2016) use data from MY 2004-6 vehic es to
estimate a number of diferent econometric mode s and test their predictions against MY 2007 and 2010 vehic e sa es. They fnd that a
simp e mode ike ours – that is, one that assumes constant market
shares – performs we compared to other mode s for one year forecasts
of MY 2007. Haaf et a . (2014) a so fnd that a simp e mode outperforms mu tinomia , mixed, and nested ogit mode s, even when varying
the functiona form of the uti ity function and the set of attributes used
for the prediction. Like Haaf et a . (2016), we fnd that a sma er cost
coefcient – zero, in our case – improves our predictions. Inc uding
changes in price biases estimates in the wrong direction. Price increases
corre ated with increases in unobserved vehic e qua ity, changes in
28
These resu ts ho d even when we aggregate vehic es to the manufacturerc ass eve .

Table 4
Goodness-of-prediction measures.
2010

Ku back-Leib er Divergence
Mean Squared Error
Average Share Error
Right Direction

2016

NML

Simple

NML

Simple

0.351
9.820E-06
0.001127
63%

0.212
5.330E-06
0.000842

0.659
1.330E-04
0.004599
72%

0.271
2.510E-05
0.002967

preferences, or brand-specifc changes in market size may exp ain this
fnding, due to their expected opposite efects on the price coefcient.
For the short run, these resu ts suggest that persistence of market
shares is a strong predictor of future market shares. For a horizon of at
east 4 years, Haaf et a . (2014) fnd that inc uding vehic e attributes
improves prediction accuracy over the simp e mode . They cite entry by
new vehic es as the reason for the simp e mode 's poor prediction accuracy over a onger horizon. A mode inc uding vehic e attributes,
however, requires forecasts of those attributes in the future, which increases uncertainty. Uncertainty grows non- inear y when these forecasted parameters interact, potentia y making the mode ess usefu for
po icy (Sa te i and Funtowicz, 2014). We fnd that the simp e mode
continues to outperform the nested ogit in 2016.
5.1. Relation hip between change in price and market hare
To get a better sense of the re ationship between changes in price
and market share, Fig. 4 shows patterns for the six argest manufacturers in 2010. The x-axis is the percentage change in price (MSRP)
in 2010, re ative to 2008. The y-axis is the percentage change in market
share in 2010, re ative to 2008.29 To make the graphs easier to read, the
percentage changes are top-coded at 200% for the share increase and
40% for the price increase. The NL mode has a cost coefcient term Bk
that is negative and approximated using e asticities reported in the
iterature. If there is a negative re ationship between price and share,
the scatter p ots shou d be downward s oping from eft to right. Honda
comes c osest to exhibiting this re ationship; the other automakers fai
to show such a pattern. For examp e, for Toyota the re ationship between price and market share appears to be positive. This wou d be
consistent with prices accompanying improved vehic e qua ity or an
increase in demand.30
For the remaining automakers, the re ationship is unc ear. Chrys er
and Genera Motors shares appear shifted downward, consistent with a
brand-specifc shock such as imited non-bank fnancing for these two
companies (Benme ech et a ., 2017). Ford may have benefted from
these restrictions, with severa vehic es experiencing arge increases in
market share and price in the upper right quadrant. Toyota, Honda, and
Nissan had a sma set of vehic es that experienced increases in market
share. For Toyota, the Camry, Prius, and Coro a saw increased sa es in
2010 re ative to 2008. Margina buyers who abstained from purchasing
during the Great Recession may have been those that preferred
29
For examp e, if a vehic e had a market share of 0.5% in 2008 and 0.4% in
2010, the re ative change wou d be 20%.
30
We use the 2008 MSRP and the change in MSRP instead of transacted price,
which inc udes cash incentives for dea ers and customers. Using MSRP wi bias
the nested ogit predictions if automakers chose MSRP and cash incentives
joint y, instead of using cash incentives for unanticipated responses to fuctuations in demand. For examp e, if automakers increased MSRP but added cash
incentives such that the transacted price fa s, this cou d increase sa es (either
direct y, from a ower price, or indirect y, through reference dependence). We
know that automakers use cash incentives defensive y, to address regiona demand shocks or gas price shocks (Langer and Mi er, 2013), but we are not
aware of evidence that they are joint y determined. If they are, this may be
another reason to use a simp er mode when predicting vehic e market share.

Fig. 1. 1Annua Variation in price, fue economy, and market share.

Fig. 2. 2Nested ogit structure of consumer choice mode .

manufacturers' ess popu ar vehic es.
Announced standards may have ed to product design changes to
increase fue economy that fai ed to pass techno ogy costs through to
price. Fig. 1 fai s to suggest a strong re ationship between price and fue
economy changes. Reynert (2014) shows evidence that automakers in
Europe responded to announcements of standards enough to reach
comp iance ear y, and they comp ied via techno ogy, not sa es-mixing.
For the U.S., trends in fue economy techno ogy penetration support
this prediction: Gaso ine Direct Injection was used in ess than 3% of
vehic es in MY 2008 and is projected to reach ha f of the MY 2016
mode s (US EPA, 2016). The number of car mode s with a minimum of

30 MPG was 28 in 2008, 40 in 2010, and expected to be near y 70 in
2016 (EPA, 2016). The pattern is simi ar for SUVs; the number of SUV
mode s with at east 25 MPG was 10 in 2008, 14 in 2010, and near y 50
in 2016. The difusion of fue -saving techno ogy to riva s is good for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; Sutton (2007) describes a simi ar
pattern in Japanese o igopo ies. However, difusion a so reduces returns
to investment in innovation.
5.2. Change in ne t and automaker market hare
Fig. 5 reports observed abso ute changes in market share between

instead of rea ized retai prices).
6. Discussi n

Fig. 3. 3Cumu ative error distribution (2010 resu ts).

2008 and 2010 and 2008 and 2016 by nest and manufacturer in order
to ofer upper bounds for structura mode po icy simu ations. We focus
on the changes in 2010 here; patterns are most y simi ar for 2016. In
2010, sa es grew s ight y more concentrated: the Herfndah -Hirschman
Index grew from 1,271 in 2008 to 1,308 in 2010. We report resu ts for
automakers and the owest eve nests that had at east 4% market
share.31 We fnd that the Great Recession increased the share of Standard Cars at the expense of prestige cars, prestige SUVs, and pickups,
among others. The Standard Car c ass market share increased by a most
5 percentage points, main y from increased sa es for four vehic es: the
Ford Fusion, and the Toyota Camry, Coro a, and Prius. Coro a sa es
trip ed in 2010, despite fat prices and fue economy and ower priced
riva s.
In contrast, GM and Chrys er/Fiat ost 5% and 1.5% market share.
These decreases in market share may be driven by ess access to nonbank enders associated with GM and Chrys er, who were constrained
during the Great Recession (Benme ech et a ., 2017). They cou d a so be
driven by brand-specifc shocks due to the auto bai out (Goo sbee and
Krueger, 2015). The net efect was a oss of market eadership by GM, a
resu t that echoes the importance of idiosyncratic, industry-specifc
shocks as a driver of changes in market eadership in Japanese o igopo ies (Sutton, 2007). Toyota and Ford market share increase by about
4% across the two years.
5.3. Ne ted logit model en itivity
One possib e reason for the superior performance of the simp e
mode is if the nested ogit mode is sensitive to parameter va ues and
we use the wrong parameter va ues. This is a potentia prob em with
more comp ex mode s in po icymaking – they create more opportunities
for uncertainty and disagreement about parameter va ues, potentia y
rendering them ess credib e in the eyes of the pub ic (Sa te i and
Funtowicz, 2014). To investigate mode sensitivity, we took the base
feet in 2008 and simu ated a 20 percent increase in fue economy to a
vehic es and no increase in price. We then compared predicted market
shares with our preferred parameter va ues and a 20 percent increase in
fue economy to: variation in the mode 's initia feet; the expert e icited
e asticities; the discount rate; and the payback period. Fu resu ts from
the sensitivity ana ysis are reported in the appendix. We found that the
mode 's predictions were fair y insensitive to changes in parameter
va ues and transformations of the initia feet, making it un ike y that
the simp e mode 's success is driven by parameter va ues. It cou d,
however, be driven by the nesting structure, the interaction of parameter va ues, or data qua ity (i.e. manufacturer's suggested retai price
31

The fu set of c asses and manufacturers are used in the feet- eve resu ts.

A priori, the way that auto manufacturers wi achieve GHG/fue
economy standards is ambiguous. On the one hand, the automakers can
add fue -saving techno ogies, which are ike y to increase prices if automakers pass through costs.32 Another possibi ity is that standards
may induce strategic pricing, where frms achieve comp iance by
shifting the mix of vehic es so d through prices –a strategy known as
“sa es-mixing” (e.g., Go dberg, 1998; Jacobsen, 2013).33
We can reconsider the choice between adding techno ogy and using
price in the context of a dynamic o igopo y mode where the equi ibrium is persistent market shares. If consumers form habits, sa es today
afect future sa es. When choosing a vehic e, changes in price or fue
economy may be ess sa ient to consumers than persistent, unobserved
vehic e characteristics. Instead of passing through techno ogy costs,
frms may choose ower markups today in order to avoid osing sa es
both today and in the future. Likewise, though a sa es-mixing strategy
might reduce the cost of comp iance today, it may bring arge future
opportunity costs. If markups are higher on ess fue efcient vehic es,
and consumers form habits, shifting consumers to more efcient vehic es resu ts in fewer future sa es on vehic es with higher markups.
Given tradeofs between current and future profts, automakers may
respond to standards with increased innovation in and adoption of fue
economy techno ogy. In this way, they cou d improve fue economy at
ower cost, keeping current and future markups high. An innovation
response wou d be in ine with the Porter Hypothesis, which states that
environmenta regu ations may “trigger innovation that may partia y
or more than fu y ofset the costs of comp ying with them” (Porter and
Van der Linde, 1995, 98, cited in Ambec et a ., 2013). An innovation
response may be more ike y in o igopo y settings, where market eaders
may prefer to “coast” and neg ect investment in research and deve opment un ess their market eader positions becomes threatened
(Ericson and Pakes, 1995). For industries in Japan, Sutton (2007)
documents persistent market share and, for some industries, shares
remain stab e because successfu innovations are quick y imitated by
riva s.
For vehic es, there is evidence of an innovation response. K ier and
Linn (2016) show an increased rate of adoption of fue -saving techno ogy in response to fue economy standards. Reynaert (2014) found
that frms used a techno ogy response to comp y with European GHG
standards. In this case, fue economy standards wou d increase innovation, owering the costs of achieving the standards.
7. C nclusi n and p licy implicati ns
Within the Great Recession, we assessed the re ative forecasting
performance of a nested ogit mode and a simp e mode of persistent
market shares. The nested ogit mode was deve oped for predicting the
future vehic e feet given fue economy standards and techno ogy costs.
The simp e mode was motivated by empirica evidence of persistence
in o igopo ies. Using vehic e sa es in 2008, 2010, and 2016, we compared each mode 's goodness-of-prediction using three error measures.
32
For instance, improving the fue economy of a minivan from 18 mi es per
ga on (mpg) to 22 mpg, as occurred with the Honda Odyssey between 2010
and 2014, is expected to save $400/year, according to fue economy.gov. The
2014 mode is isted as about $2000 - $4000 more expensive than the ear ier
version; it has changed in characteristics other than fue economy during that
time.
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In the medium to ong run, they may change vehic e characteristics such as
1) improved techno ogy (K ier and Linn, 2012) or changes in vehic e size
(Whitefoot and Sker os, 2012; Whitefoot et a ., 2017) or 2) changing the vehic es they ofer in their feet (introducing more efcient mode s or retiring
mode s that fai the standards).

Fig. 4. 4Price and market share change (2010 Resu ts).

Fig. 5. 5Percentage Point Change in Share for Nests and Automakers. Note: Automakers restricted to those with at east 4% market share.

For each measure, for each horizon, we found that the simp e mode 's
forecasts were ess biased than those from the nested ogit mode .
Comparing the simp e mode to the nested ogit framework, we
earn that inc uding information on vehic e price and fue economy
increased prediction bias. Sensitivity ana yses of the nested ogit mode ,
reported in the appendix, make it un ike y that this resu t is driven by
parameter va ues. Though it is possib e the nested ogit's poor performance cou d be driven by mode design, e.g. nest structure or combination of parameter va ues, or the discrepancy between manufacturer's
suggested retai price and rea ized retai prices, better prediction

performance from the simp e mode is consistent with other vehic e
mode ing comparisons (Haaf et a . 2014, 2016) and in other contexts
(e.g. hea thcare, Bayati et a ., 2018, or oi spot prices, A quist and
Ki ian, 2010). Given these resu ts, more research is needed to va idate
vehic e choice mode s before they can be re iab y used in a regu atory
context. Researchers mode ing consumer vehic e choice shou d consider
further va idation as part of their research. In the meantime, using past
market shares may be a good approximation for vehic e markets.
During the Great Recession, automakers fai ed to pass a ong costs
associated with improved fue economy. Between 2008 and 2010,

automakers increased fue economy by 3% but prices remained about
the same. Between 2008 and 2016, fue economy increased by 20% and
prices changed by 5.5%. Changes in vehic e price appear uncorre ated
with changes in fue economy. However, given prediction bias in the
nested ogit mode , price changes appear corre ated with changes in
unobserved vehic e qua ity, changes in consumer preferences, or brandspecifc changes in market size. We fai to fnd evidence of automakers
anticipating comp iance via sa es mixing. Instead, automakers may
comp y with greenhouse gas emissions standards through product design by adding fue -saving techno ogies, consistent with the Porter
Hypothesis (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995). A techno ogy response is
consistent with the European experience (Reynert, 2014), with US
regu atory agencies' mode s (US EPA and DOT, 2010, 2012), and with
recent work eva uating the product design response to US and European
standards since 2003 (K ier and Linn, 2016). Automaker techno ogy
adoption appears to maintain market share, consistent with predictions
in o igopo y settings (Sutton, 2006).
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supp ementary data to this artic e can be found on ine at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.enpo .2019.02.051.
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